Written by Mordechai Chaziza and
Ogen S. Goldman.
Since its foundation, Beijing has
experienced several major shifts in its behaviour towards the outside world. As
a long-time champion of equal sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful
resolution of conflicts, China has displayed extreme caution in refraining from
interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries and from endorsing the
use of coercive power to resolve intrastate wars.
However, the evidence which our last
study revealed suggests that, among the major world powers, the number, extent,
and diversity of Beijing’s interventions in intrastate wars is significantly
different only from that of the United States and the USSR/Russia. This finding
can be explained by two factors. First, the global aspirations of the two super
powers, which China does not possess. These global aspirations put the two
superpowers in competition for spheres of influence worldwide, so motivating
them to interfere in intrastatecivil wars more frequently than China (at least
during the Cold War). The second factor
is the relatively low material capacity of China, compared to the United States
and the USSR.
China is the only power that has not
sent troops to interfere in intrastate wars. On the other hand about two thirds
of other types of Chinese interventions were in states in geographic proximity
to China. Thus the capacity to transport troops overseas does not appear to
explain why China did not send troops for military interventions in intrastate
wars.
The main reason for Beijing to
insist on a principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations is
that China does not want other countries to interfere in its own. Moreover, the
non-interference principle is important to China’s sovereignty and core
interests. Despite China’s considerable national strength, Western powers have
interfered persistently in issues concerning Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang and in
the economic and ideological spheres as well.
Why is there a discrepancy between
the Chinese principle and practice? This gap can be explained first by the fact
that discrepancies of this kind in foreign policy are certainly not confined to
China. Secondly, like other powers, Beijing soon discovered that its principles
and interests were not always shared by other international actors, and that
states cannot control the external setting in which they operate. Therefore,
China had to adapt to the threats and opportunities the international arena
laid on its doorstep, and thus breached its own principle of non-intervention.
In summary, the Chinese dilemma is
two-fold: on the one hand, Beijing does not want to take action against the
international community in any way, and eagerly seeks a way to guarantee
China’s peaceful development. On the other, China is not abandoning its basic
diplomatic principle, which is consistent with its long-term interest and
tradition. Beijing’s determination to keep non-interference as its basic
diplomatic practice raises questions about how China should respond to the
challenges presented to this principle, how long the non-interference policy
can be sustained, and whether its interests would be better served by
abandoning it for a less rigid position. Chinese current behavior has not given
satisfying answers to these questions.
This piece is a short version of the
main findings of a study which was published in: Mordechai Chazziza and Ogen S.
Goldman (2014) “Revisiting China’s Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate
Wars”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(1): 1-27. This post distributed
first in time at the Blog of China Policy Institute: Analysis.
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